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BOOK REVIEWS

WHAT IS THE KEY TO VICTORY?
Desch, Michael C. Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2008. 232pp. $45

The notion that “democracies don’t
fight one another” is well known, but
recently some scholars have made a
stronger claim—that when democracies
do fight wars, their battlefield effectiveness is far greater than that of nondemocracies with comparable technology
and training.
Michael Desch challenges the supposed
military prowess of democracies in his
book Power and Military Effectiveness:
The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Desch, a political scientist, holds
the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security DecisionMaking at Texas A&M University and is
an authority on civil-military relations.
His past work argues that it is strategic
interests, not regime types, that determine a nation’s security policy. His latest book extends that theme by
delivering a convincing rebuttal to what
he calls the “democratic triumphalists.”
The case of the “triumphalists” rests
upon statistical analyses showing that
democracies have been more likely to
win wars than other political systems
over the last two hundred years. Desch
challenges these studies head on,
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arguing that in most cases the democracies in question would have been expected to win in any case, due to
traditional military advantages (the
United States in the 1991 Gulf war) or
to motivation, national survival being
on the line (Israel in 1973), and that in
other cases there may have been errors
and uncertainties in the data sets themselves. To prove his point, Desch offers
four case studies: the Russo-Polish War
(1919–20), the battle for France (1940),
the Falklands War (1982), and Israel’s
wars from 1948 to 1982. These case
studies trace the details of governmental decision making and the military
operations of each conflict, showing
that the factors identified by the
triumphalists were not the key drivers
of battlefield outcomes.
The combination of quantitative analysis and case studies is notable. Few authors are comfortable working in both
methods, but Desch demonstrates both
methodological sophistication and a
command of military history. However,
one might ask for a more thorough exploration of a few issues. One example
is how quick Desch is to dismiss the
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possibility that democracies grow faster
economically than other regimes and
thus accumulate more resources in the
long run. Such questions are minor,
though, and the overall case is quite
persuasive.
This book is a must for scholars of military effectiveness or civil-military relations. The statistical sections will satisfy
researchers; they might be a bit difficult
for general readers, but overall the work
should interest a broad audience of national security professionals. Desch’s
writing is excellent throughout, with
lively case studies and clear explanations of his theories and results.
One hopes that policy makers will read
this book. As Desch notes, democratic
triumphalism has become popular in
Washington. The mistaken belief that
democracy itself is a “force multiplier”
could lead officials to underestimate the
risks of U.S. interventions or to encourage unduly weak but democratic U.S.
allies. Desch offers a warning that it is
superior strategy, resources, and skill,
not the magic bullet of democracy, that
remain the keys to victory.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Doyle, Michael. Striking First: Preemption and
Prevention in International Conflict. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 200pp. $24.95

Even before the United States and its allies embarked on war in Iraq in 2003,
the question of whether it is acceptable
to strike enemies without clear provocation was an increasingly vexing one to
policy makers, academics, and legal experts. “Preemptive war” (attacking an
enemy who is clearly about to strike
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you first) has always been an acceptable
response to a dire and clear threat. But
“preventive war” (striking a potential
enemy while circumstances are favorable to the attacker, or striking in early
anticipation of a possible, or even only
theoretical, threat) has traditionally
been regarded in the international
community as not only unwise but
immoral.
In this slim, tightly reasoned volume,
one of America’s foremost foreignpolicy thinkers tackles the problem of
preventive war and reaches surprising
conclusions. While rejecting the
so-called Bush Doctrine, which putatively grants to the United States almost
unlimited permission to attack almost
any threat in any form, Doyle delivers a
clear warning that the previous rules of
war do not apply in the twenty-first
century. Doyle struggles (as have other
scholars in many nations over the past
decade) to find criteria that would allow preventive attacks in an internationally acceptable framework. He
settles on four criteria: lethality, likelihood, legitimacy, and legality.
The book is actually a collection of essays by four other scholars, who supply
a foreword and criticism of Doyle’s
chapters, to which Doyle responds in a
conclusion. The debate format is lively
and makes this work a particularly useful tool for introducing students at advanced levels to the subject.
Although Doyle’s prose is direct and
clear, in places he makes overly structured arguments, and his attempt to set
his four criteria into a matrix produces
something more like a rigid template.
Doyle certainly recognizes that the perception of a threat, versus the actual
threat, is often idiosyncratic and affected by a slew of factors, but his
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